Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction and fair division game.
Introduction
Equality of profits is often a major concern of cooperating parties like, for instance, of firms, other organizations, or private persons engaged in joint ventures. The problem we study is not how to share profits equally during the joint venture but rather to induce equal profits when terminating it. For this situation, we assume that an indivisible object, e.g. the joint venture firm but also any other unique indivisible commodity like a house or a painting, has to be allocated to one of several parties who state "profits" by bidding.
The rules of bidding thus have to determine for all possible bid vectors who "wins" the object and what the "winner" must pay. In case of an auction, the payment goes to the seller who is not a member of the bidder group for which we want to guarantee equality of stated profits. In fair division conflicts where the bidders collectively own the object what the "winner" pays are the monetary compensations for the non-winning bidders.
From imposing envy-freeness of net trades according to bids (Güth, 1986) , it follows that the winner is the highest bidder and that the price must be in the interval of the second-highest and highest bid. In case of fair division conflicts, the "price" is the sum of equal monetary compensations. Additionally requiring equal stated profits of all bidders uniquely determines the price rule asking the winner to pay a price equal to his own bid. The two axioms together thus characterize the first-price auction and fair division game.
Axiomatic analysis
with integer 2 n ≥ denote the group of bidders i N ∈ and assume some indivisible valuable object which • in case of an auction is owned by an external seller offering to sell the object to one of the bidders in N
• in case of a fair division conflict, it is collectively owned by the group N of bidders who, however, want to sell the object to one of them, e.g. to terminate a joint venture.
As usual for the legal rules, e.g. those of public procurement auctions (see Gandenberger, 1961 , for some historical account) or those for dissolving joint ventures and settling inheritance and divorce conflicts, we assume bidders i N ∈ to submit monetary bids ( ) 
Similarly, for fair division conflicts the requirement 
Proposition:
For auctions as well as for fair division conflicts, axiom 1 and 2 together imply to allocate the object to the highest bidder at the price of his bid, i.e., according to the first-price rule.
General truth telling, i.e., bids expressing true evaluations, guarantees thus both, envy-freeness of net trades and equality of profits for all bidders, not only in view of stated but also in view of true evaluations. In case of auctions, our axiomatic approach could be more relevant for procurement by public authorities or agencies, so-called public tender auctions, than for private sales auctions where the seller may prefer revenue maximizing rules (e.g. Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Mascin and Riley, 1984) over procedurally fair ones. This may be different when private sellers employ auction houses or (Internet) platforms which may feel obliged to procedural fairness to attract many bidders. In case of fair division conflicts, procedural fairness seems to be of utmost importance and is often legally implemented to resolve conflicts when the parties cannot agree among themselves on the rules of bidding to be used.
Discussion
The two axioms, applied above, define fair rules (of bidding) without necessarily claiming that this implies fair allocation results as, for instance, judged by the bidders' true rather than stated evaluations where even that would be guaranteed if bids were truthful. Imposing incentive compatibility (in the sense of dominance solvability) instead of axiom 2 would have characterized the second-price auction (Vickrey, 1961) and implied an impossibility result for fair division conflicts (Güth, 1986 ).
The rules (of bidding) which we have derived above are not yet complete in the sense of yielding well-defined games. To complete the rule specification, one would have to include true evaluations and what bidders know about the true evaluations of their co-bidders (see Güth and van Damme, 1986 , and for experimental studies Güth, 1986; Güth et al., 2002 and 2003; Becker and Brünner, 2009 Equality is postulated by equity theory (Homans, 1961) in situations where all bidders i N ∈ have contributed equally to the success, e.g. of a joint venture, and is seen as an important goal which, however, may be conflicting with own profit maximization according to the concept of inequity aversion (e.g. Bazerman, Löwenstein and Thomson, 1989; Bolton, 1991; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) . The (experimental) confirmation so far relies on small group interaction without stochastic uncertainty, e.g. in the sense of private information.
With private information people may not be equality seeking, as judged by their true evaluations, but may rather try to guarantee only equality of stated profits.
